Kirkuk compromise prospects brighten

19_op_kirkuk_41.jpgIraq’s President Jalal Talabani (left) speaks to reporters during his meeting with Massoud Barzani (right), president of the Kurdish regional government in Arbil, northern Iraq
By Oxford Analytica

Despite US and UN assistance, the status of Kirkuk remains deadlocked, and tension in the disputed city is rising.

EVENT: The Article 23 Committee on Kirkuk failed to submit its recommendations by the March 31 deadline set by Iraq’s parliament and is now expected to do so by late May.

SIGNIFICANCE: Despite US and UN assistance, the status of Kirkuk remains deadlocked, and tension in the disputed city is rising.

There is growing appetite among local groups for a compromise solution that involves Kirkuk being declared a special region that is neither within the KRG nor directly administered from Baghdad

A census and a resultant new power-sharing formula would then follow in time, followed by new provincial elections in Kirkuk in 2013 (ie., at the same time as the other 17 provinces)

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At present, neither the Kurds nor the Arab nationalist factions appear to be willing to compromise on Kirkuk. Only after the early 2010 national elections will either side have sufficient political freedom to make painful sacrifices

Analysis:

A combination of interrelated issues lie at the heart of the dispute between the Arab political blocs in Baghdad and the Kurdish parties of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). They are:

– the future administration of Kirkuk, a city claimed by Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen communities

– the administration of up to 40 other Disputed Internal Boundary (DIB) territories along the edge of the KRG;

– oil development policy and fiscal independence in the KRG

– command and control of security forces in the DIB and KRG areas; and

– provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces, which were both excluded from the January provincial elections held in 14 provinces.

A number of processes have been established which are moving forward simultaneously on the status of Kirkuk, the highest-profile issue:

The Article 23 Committee has seven Iraqi National Assembly parliamentarians (two each from the Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen communities, plus one Christian). The committee is charged with developing recommendations on property claims and residency rights, as well as power-sharing, that can be turned into a Kirkuk special elections law by the National Assembly. The committee is now unlikely to produce its recommendations before late May.

A parallel and informal Article 23 working group is made up of members of the Kirkuk provincial council, focused on power-sharing formulas.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is producing studies on Kirkuk and other DIBs in mid-April, including practical steps to reduce tensions in Kirkuk and enable multi-ethnic power-sharing.

The US embassy in Baghdad has appointed a US envoy for northern Iraq affairs to support the Article 23 and UNAMI processes. The US military has scaled up its military commitment to Kirkuk province from battalion (1,000 men) to brigade-strength (3,000 men), in contrast to drawdown in most other parts of the country.

Kirkuk’s main political blocs are getting increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress on the city’s administrative status. Kirkuk factions perceive outside factors – notably the broader Baghdad-KRG struggle – to be a brake on resolution of the Kirkuk issue:

From 2003 to the present day, the city has been administratively isolated from the full support of the federal government.

Kirkuk city is controlled by Kurdish-led Iraqi Police forces and the federal Iraqi Army is not allowed to come within agreed city limits without police (ie., Kurdish) permission.

Kirkuk’s technical directorates – local branches of federal ministries – are Kurdish-led and, as a result, have become disconnected from the federal system to an extent that is unique for a major Iraqi city. The KRG is cash-strapped and cannot bankroll the development of the city.

As a result, the city is caught in administrative limbo and cannot fully control the insurgency that continues in Kirkuk due to Kurdish unwillingness to call upon federal government reinforcements.

There is growing appetite among local groups for a compromise solution that involves Kirkuk being declared a special region that is neither within the KRG nor directly administered from Baghdad. This would require the Kirkuk provincial council to develop as a miniature government, effectively becoming the only semi-autonomous single province region in Iraq:

For Kirkuk’s Arab and Turkmen residents, the idea is attractive.

There are signs that war-weary Kurdish refugees living in shanty towns across northern Kirkuk would be willing to accept the solution as long as it expedites the resettlement process and guarantees them permanent high-quality housing in the city.

UNAMI and the Article 23 Committee are now investigating the practical steps that would need to be taken to make this kind of power-sharing arrangement possible. The outlines of an interim solution are becoming visible:

Kirkuk would be named a special region until at least 2013.

A formula (probably a 32-32-32-4 percentage split) would fix the ethnic balance of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians respectively on the 41-member provincial council.

Distribution of key provincial council positions would be fixed with a similar formula.

Provincial elections would then be held, with the results being used to decide exactly which politicians filled out the pre-arranged number of seats given to each faction on the provincial council. This would bestow a degree of legitimacy on the provincial council members, making them more capable of running the day-to-day affairs of Kirkuk.

A census and a resultant new power-sharing formula would then follow in time, followed by new provincial elections in Kirkuk in 2013 (ie., at the same time as the other 17 provinces).

While there has been incremental progress on the Kirkuk issues, there are many potential obstacles that could slow or stall the conflict resolution processes underway:

– Iraqi parliamentary politics – These could make Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki and other Arab blocs unwilling to compromise on Kirkuk. With national elections looming in early 2010, Maliki will need to build his political base as an Arab nationalist leader if he is to maximise his chances of being re-elected as prime minister by a majority of parliamentarians. Fomenting or exacerbating greater tension with the Kurds could bolster his credentials as a nationalist leader and a military leader.

– KRG politics – Elections in the three KRG provinces will probably occur in early summer 2009, and this will sharpen the political divisions that are emerging within the KRG. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is suffering a political leadership crisis due to the failing health of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader. PUK weakness is boosting the influence wielded by its rival, the larger Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), both in the KRG and in Kirkuk city.

All these factors are likely to drive Kurdish leaders to compete to demonstrate their Kurdish nationalism and their unwillingness to compromise with Baghdad.

– UNAMI and the United States: Both have limited influence over Iraqi and Kurdish decision-making. UNAMI’s earlier set of trial recommendations on four DIB areas leaned towards a stronger federal government role in the areas and was poorly received in the KRG. The US government, meanwhile, appears unwilling to expend considerable political capital to affect the outcome of the Kirkuk issue. However, if Washington leans in any direction, it is increasingly towards the federal government in Baghdad. These factors may make the Kurds feel more isolated and act more aggressively.

– Outlook: At present, neither the Kurds nor the Arab nationalist factions appear to be willing to compromise on Kirkuk. Only after the early 2010 national elections will either side have sufficient political freedom to make painful sacrifices. Even then, the Kurds will probably need to reduce their demands in order to win a place in whatever Arab ruling coalition emerges.

CONCLUSION:

Despite the potential for minor clashes and scares throughout 2009, a dramatic military showdown between Kirkuk’s Kurds and the Iraqi Army is unlikely. Special status for Kirkuk from 2010-13 is the most likely outcome, meaning that the city will neither join the KRG nor fall fully under federal government control. The federal government and KRG will test each other’s resolve on the fringes of Kirkuk city and its oilfields, but a major meltdown in security remains unlikely.

http://www.gulfnews.com/region/Iraq/10305253.html