US-Ally “Al Qaeda”, White and Gray ´Kurdistan´, Turkey, Iran, and the ICG Report

Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
In three earlier articles, entitled “ICG Report Reveals Freemasonic Plans for Destruction of Turkey, Diffusion of Pseudo-Islamic Terror” (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-reveals-freemasonic-plans-for-destruction-of-turkey-diffusion-of-pseudo-islamic-terror.html), “ICG Report Rejected as Fallacy – There is no Kurdistan, and there are no Kurds” (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-rejected-as-fallacy-there-is-no-kurdistan-and-there-are-no-kurds.html), and “ICG Report, Turkey, Iraq, ´Kurdistan´, and the Nefarious, Age-Old Franco-Mongol Alliance” (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-turkey-iraq-kurdistan-and-the-nefarious-age-old-franco-mongol-alliance.html), I republished the Executive Summary, the Recommendations, the Introduction, the First Chapter and parts of the Second Chapter of the ICG Report “Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds”. The Report diffuses ideas and suggestions that risk spreading chaos and discord, bloodshed and in the wider Middle Eastern region, by facilitating the procedures of the formation of a fake state ´Kurdistan´. In this article, I republish further parts of the controversial Report.

As I already said, such a state would be a tyrannical fabrication that will enslave several historical nations of the area which is falsely called ´Kurdistan´ (Turks, Aramaeans (involving ´Chaldaeans´ and ´Assyrians´), Turkmen, Shabbak, Loris, Armenians and Azeris), and many nations and ethno-religious groups who have been fallaciously called “Kurds” whereas they are not (the Zazas, the Hawramis, the Gilakis and the other Goranis, the Failis, the Yazidis, the Ahl-e Haq (Yarsanis), the Mukris, the Ardelanis, the Hawleris, and the other Soranis).

All these different nations and ethno-religious groups will become expendable stuff in the hands of the forthcoming Islamist leadership of Kurdistan which is being formed and protected by the criminal agents of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge, the real promoter of the rise of an Islamist Kurdistan geared to trigger apocalyptic wars in the Middle East that will end with the imposition of a prefab, fake peace.

According to this plan, the remnants of the Ilkhanid Mongols, after having lived for centuries among the various local peoples of the Zagros mountains and amalgamated among them, will be used (portrayed as ´Kurds´) to form an Islamist regime that will simply make the (currently visible but gullible and idiotic) Talabani and Barzani puppets vanish. The otherwise odd pattern of an Islamist leadership allied with the Frankish West and the West´s allies in the East, notably Armenia, has been attested already before 700 years – the times of the evil and barbaric Ilkhanid dynasty.

Iraqi “Kurdish” Oil to Finance the Destruction of Turkey, Iran

The process involves an unimaginable escalation; a relatively small nucleus of a fake state Kurdistan will first be attempted. It will use resources to trigger further chaos. The initial tiny Kurdish state´s Oil income will finance the expansion project that will cause the absolute chaos. In fact, the Kurdistan Project 1 involves the so-called Iraqi Kurdistan and adjacent areas taken from the Iranian and the Turkish territories.

In Iraq, the Kurdistan Project 1 “certain” territories are those depicted on the map as white. An effort and a bargain should be expected, negotiations and threats should be anticipated, blackmails and false promises should be presumed for more territories to be added to the original nucleus; these territories appear gray-coloured on the map.

Who is urged for these developments?

The Apostate Freemasonic Lodge and their mobilized puppets, the US, UK and French diplomats, military, politicians and statesmen, who act under the coverage of promoting peace and seeking “logical” solutions for all.

What is the purpose of the gray zone?

To help the terrorist gangsters Talabani and Barzani drive Turkmen and Aramaean Christians (also called ´Assyrians´ and ´Chaldaeans´) out of their historical homeland and then perpetrate an ignominious act of genocide against the Yazidis.

Pretexts will certainly be found in this regard, Turkey will be considered as a homeland for the Turkmen, who will be forced to migrate.

The West in its entirety will be portrayed as homeland for the Christians, who will be constrained to abandon properties and lands and seek safety outside Iraq.

The Forthcoming Genocide of the Yazidis

The planned migrations consist in sheer ethnic cleansing. What is worse comes after; having long portrayed the aforementioned, diverse, peoples and ethno-religious groups as just” Kurds”, the criminal Western mass media and diplomatic – political establishments will cease to report from “Independent Kurdistan”, portraying the devastating wars and genocides that are to be expected there as mere “tribal clashes”.

Plunged in a financial – economic chaos, the Western peoples will not bother to further focus.

Then, the Yazidis will be eliminated first. Fanaticism is being incited by the terrorist gangs of Talabani and Barzani against the Yazidis who are portrayed as infidels, lackeys of the West, and evil-worshippers.

These developments are not however unrelated with other critical issues of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

US – Israeli Attack Against Iran to Precipitate the Formation of “Kurdistan”

Before the Iraqi Kurdistan declares independence, Iran will be attacked by either the US or Israel or both. In the ensuing chaos, clashes will be triggered in parts of the Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan-Gharbi (Urumiyeh), Kordestan (Sanandaj) and Kermanshah.

This is precisely the mini-project which is being carried out now by the Halabja Al Qaeda cell which is so well protected by the gangster Talabani and the US – UK – French accomplices.

Subversion within Iran involves mostly the aggravation of the relationship among several peoples and ethno-religious groups living in the aforementioned provinces; particularly targeted are in this case the Ahl-e Haq, who represent some of the greatest and noblest pages of the Oriental Civilization but are mere ´infidels´ for the barbaric and besotted Al Qaeda gangsters, the lackeys of the Anglo-French Freemasonry.

As Iran pays little attention to the subject, it will be impossible for Tehran to contain the developments when Iran´s nuclear installations will be hit and chaos spread throughout the country. Then, the secession of the aforementioned provinces will be effectuated through a sudden great concern exceptionally accorded to the subject by the UN Security Council.

Evil European – American Game Against Turkey

Meanwhile, the deterioration of the socio-economic and political situation in Turkey will have advanced. While arming rebels and inciting terrorist incidents to trigger despair throughout the Turkish society, the criminal US – EU diplomats and politicians – being in their majority puppets and agents of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge – will be demanding from their Turkish interlocutors further democratization under the pretext of Turkey´s supposed adhesion to the European Union.

At the same time, European Union´s illegal interference in Turkey´s national security affairs and the EU Commission´s undemocratic demand for the Turkish military to be ousted from the epicenter of the political decision-making will further cause havoc resulting in ostensible inability to manage the crisis provoked by the European useless and inimical advisers who cannot hide their ulcerous hatred of Turkey.

At the end, the pacification will be depicted as the consequence of an eventual acceptance of autonomy for large parts of SE Turkey (Gaziantep, Urfa, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Bingol, Mus, Van and Agri) and secession for a tiny part comprising Cizre and Hakkari. These will be the corresponding gray and white zones delineated for the supposed Turkish Kurdistan´s territory.

Turkey and Iran should react immediately and take measures that will prevent future developments from taking place and the aforementioned agenda from being materialized. On the subject, I will expand further, as the Kurdistan Project 2 consists in a serious threat against the geopolitical and geo-strategic interests of Russia and China.

Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds

Middle East Report N°80

II. Escalating Conflict Over Oil

Oil in Kirkuk and Other Disputed Territories

Inflaming the debates over oil and the disputed territories is the issue of oil in those disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. “If Kirkuk had no oil, no one would fight over it”, said Qader Aziz, KRG President Masoud Barzani´s Article 140 envoy. 116 Kirkuk has been fought over since Royal Dutch Shell found oil there in the early 1920s, coincident with the rise of the Kurdish national movement from the Ottoman Empire´s ashes. 117

The Kurdish struggle for freedom from alien rule went hand in hand with a quest to make that freedom economically sustainable. While the Kurdistan region´s oil reserves might be sufficient to provide it with a great deal of economic self-sufficiency, the size of Kirkuk´s reserves would undoubtedly do so, increasing the stakes for everyone. Speaking of Iran´s and Turkey´s red line over Kirkuk´s incorporation into the Kurdistan region, a KRG official contended: “They see Kirkuk as a base for Kurdish independence. And we as Kurds also know that without Kirkuk we will not have a good future”. 118

The Kirkuk “super-giant” oil field contains as much as 13 per cent of Iraq´s proven reserves (fifteen billion out of 115 billion barrels), 119 though estimates vary. 120 Like many of Iraq´s oil fields, however, Kirkuk´s has been poorly maintained (even mistreated), relies on outdated technology for extraction (vertical versus horizontal drilling), has been damaged by the re-injection of “dead” crude and saline water incursions and is rapidly depleting. Over time, in other words, its value and that of Kirkuk as an oil-bearing region will diminish.

Opinions are divided over the timeframe. Some claim that Kirkuk, like many current oil fields, will run out within twenty to 50 years. 121 This has given Kurdish leaders ammunition for their argument that its oil is irrelevant to their quest for either Kirkuk or independence. In their view, the matter is moot, since they agree that under the constitution the KRG would be obligated to jointly manage the Kirkuk field with the federal government, if and when Kirkuk is incorporated into the Kurdistan region, and share revenues with all Iraqis. For example, Karim Sinjari, the KRG´s minister of state for the interior, contended: “Kirkuk is very important to us. It has nothing to do with oil. The oil question has been solved in the constitution. The oil fields would stay under the federal government regardless of whether Kirkuk joins the Kurdistan region….[Moreover], we have sufficient oil in the Kurdistan region for now to survive for years. Erbil is sitting on a sea of oil”. 122

Others argue that the Kirkuk field is “unlikely to run out soon” and is “potentially one of the largest producing fields in the world”. 123 Just as importantly, this perception, correct or not, is shared by Turkey which sees Kirkuk´s oil as a worrisome stepping stone toward an independent Kurdistan on its borders. Moreover, the notion that its oil will run out within the next few decades could be one reason why the KRG is in a hurry to incorporate Kirkuk (another being to capitalise on the KRG´s relative political strength in Iraq today), ie, before there is nothing left on which to build an independent state.

The Kirkuk field, which for now remains under federal government control, is proving its worth, after many post-2003 setbacks. Although it is still producing below capacity, this is mostly because of problems in protecting the 79-km pipeline from Kirkuk to Baiji (north of Baghdad), where it links up with the main line to Ceyhan. 124 In early 2008, Kirkuk was producing an average of 600,000 b/d, about two thirds of its pre-war capacity, the majority (400,000-450,000 b/d) of which was exported via Ceyhan according to demand. 125 The remainder was sent to Iraq´s largest refinery complex, in Baiji, for domestic market processing. 126

A specific dispute has arisen over one part of the Kirkuk oil field, Khurmula dome, which juts into Erbil governorate. 127 In November 2007, the KRG awarded a service contract to build a refinery for oil derived from Khurmala dome to the newly established, KRG-owned Kurdistan National Oil Company (KNOC). 128 Later that month and again in June 2008, the KRG´s guard troops reportedly blocked federal government workers from upgrading the field. 129 The stakes are high, as the field could be producing as much as 70,000 b/d for local consumption. This could partly address the Kurdistan region´s pressing fuel needs once the refinery comes on-stream. 130

The KRG has argued that because the field extends into Erbil governorate, it is inside the Kurdistan region rather than in disputed territory, so the Kurds have full rights to it. 131 Moreover, the KRG says, the Khurmala dome has never produced and so is a new field over which the KRG should have full management rights under the constitution. Lastly, it argues, it should not matter whether the KRG or the federal government pumps the oil (and either exports it or, once a refinery is built, refines it and sells it on the local market); either way it would benefit the Iraqi people: “We are not stealing the oil”, Ashti Hawrami proclaimed. “It´s our oil; it´s Iraqi oil; we´re entitled to it. If Baghdad can do better, be my guest….Come work with us – no problem at all. But they cannot be coming here to stop us from doing it. That is not the spirit of the constitution or cooperation”. 132

Iraqi officials dispute these claims. They argue that Khurmala dome is an integral part of the Kirkuk field, which is recognised to be part of the disputed territories and remains under the federal government at least until a settlement is reached. Moreover, they say, it is not a new but an actively producing field that has been pumping 35,000 b/d since August 2004; as such, it does not fall under the KRG´s exclusive jurisdiction per Article 112 of the constitution 133

The conflict arises out of the incendiary intersection of oil, territory and facts on the ground. As stated earlier, the definition of disputed territories is ambiguous and their location itself disputed. Could parts of the three Kurdish governorates be considered disputed? The KRG appears to argue not. “You show me the green line in the constitution”, said Ashti Hawrami, referring to the line of control at the time of the U.S.-led invasion in April 2003 that separated the Kurdistan region from the rest of Iraq, including the disputed territories. “You show me a green line that officially anybody signed on to. There are many green lines. But what counts really is what is currently under the KRG authority”. 134

Yet, in other circumstances, the KRG has acknowledged that districts that were attached to Kurdish governorates as a result of Arabisation but previously belonged to Kirkuk governorate, such as Chamchamal (attached to Suleimaniya), should be restored to Kirkuk, 135 thereby contradicting the principle that land inside Kurdistan cannot be disputed. There are a number of fields, both producing and prospective, that either straddle or skirt the green line. 136 This suggests that as long as the green line remains un-demarcated, conflicts such as that over Khurmala dome will continue to arise. 137

Indeed, another already has. It involves part of a concession given to Hunt Oil of the U.S. in an area of Dohuk governorate 138 Although the exact area of the awarded blocks remains unclear, the contract provoked controversy, because some said that one (K7, “Ayn Sifna”) protrudes from the KRG´s jurisdiction into disputed territories in Ninewa governorate. 139 Hawrami has justified the contract by arguing that regardless of the structure´s precise location, revenues will accrue to the federal government and be shared fairly through its annual budget; the KRG´s actions would, therefore, not harm the federal government´s interests. 140 Moreover, contracts issued today can be cancelled tomorrow (though presumably not without a cost to the government).

In the Ayn Sifna case, however, if the block does in fact extend into disputed territory, the KRG would be disregarding its own August 2007 oil and gas law, which prevents the KRG from issuing contracts in disputed territories without the federal government´s consent. Instead, it appears to be relying on an unapproved August 2006 draft, which entitles the KRG to manage oil fields in all areas claimed by the Kurds that are likely to join the Kurdistan region pursuant to Article 140. 141

While the KRG may provide economic justifications for developing fields in the disputed territories and rationalise its unilateral policy by stating it would not adversely affect the federal government´s financial interests, its overriding motive appears to be to stake a claim to these areas, thereby prejudging their ultimate disposition. As such, the policy inevitably raises tensions. Matching the KRG´s unilateralism in kind, the federal oil ministry announced in early October 2008 that it was putting up for tender fields in disputed areas of Diyala governorate. 142 Obviously, the federal government can make the same economic arguments (that it is not harming the KRG´s financial interest) and is further supported by the fact it has sovereignty in these areas at least until their status is resolved.

As the August 2008 Khanaqin events showed, territorial conflict can arise anywhere in the disputed areas, with oil playing an important factor, particularly as prospective field boundaries and their reserves become better understood. The oil potential of areas other than Kirkuk is unknown; very little new exploration, let alone development, has occurred there or in the rest of the country. Iraq never had the incentive to prospect for new fields when it had three giant ones producing the maximum allowed for export under its OPEC quota at the time. Nor has the potential been mapped. Oil is said to be present in at least Khanaqin, 143 Makhmour 144 and contested areas of Ninewa. 145 Without progress in negotiations over the status of disputed territories, these areas will be flashpoints for future conflict between the KRG and the federal government.

Notes

116. Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 26 June 2008.

117. For example, Neywshirwan Mustafa Amin, a leading Kurdish intellectual and former PUK leader asserted that the Kurds´ first attempt to take (back) Kirkuk was in 1919, when Sheikh Mahmoud faced off with the British colonial power. In 1931, Sheikh Mahmoud prepared to attack British and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk but was defeated and sent into Iranian exile. Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 23 June 2008. While true, the Arab-Kurdish conflict gathered momentum only after the ascent of the Baath party, with its Arab nationalist ideology, in 1968 and the start of Arabisation, which focused on Kirkuk and its oil wealth. Denise Natali, “The Kirkuk Conundrum”, forthcoming in Ethnopolitics, vol. 7, no. 4 (November 2008).

118. Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 21 October 2008.

119. United Press International, 28 November 2007.

120. Some industry sources put the total at ten billion barrels, or 8-9 per cent of Iraq´s proven reserves. Platts Oilgram News, 25 August 2008; and Oil & Gas Journal, 1 January 2008. An Iraqi oil expert with specific knowledge about Kirkuk claimed that the field contains more than 15 billion barrels, not including the nearby “giant” Bai Hassan field, and that much remains to be explored and developed. Crisis Group interview, Amman, 19 October 2008.

121. A Western oil expert claimed Kirkuk is “in rapid decline”, in part because large quantities of oil (in particular, viscose fuel oil that did not have a ready market) are thought to have been re-injected into the field, without knowledge of where or how and contrary to international standards. He estimated $3.7 billion and four to five years of work (in a stable environment) would be needed to reverse the decline. Presentation by Wayne Kelly at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 9 August 2005.

122. Crisis Group interview, Erbil, 29 June 2008. Likewise, the PUK´s representative in Ankara declared: “For us it´s not a question of oil. Kirkuk oil will run out in 50 years or so. We don´t need Kirkuki oil for our independence”. Crisis Group interview, Bahros Galali, Ankara, 1 June 2006.

123. Crisis Group interview, international energy expert, Amman, 27 January 2008. Implementing a large enhanced oil recovery (EOR) program could make a big difference in rate of decline and output but would require major investment.

124. From 2004 to the middle of 2006, no Kirkuk oil was exported, because of pipeline sabotage. “The Kirkuk-Baiji pipeline…is now protected on either side by a ditch, a dirt barrier, a fence topped with razor wire, and three more rolls of razor wire on the ground. There are two guardhouses at every road crossing; the government has recruited local tribesmen suspected of mounting many past attacks to man them and conduct patrols. Oil has flowed freely since the construction of these defences began [in mid-2007]”. The Economist, 16 August 2008. A Turkoman member of the Kirkuk provincial council said the pipelines are protected by Iraq´s Oil Protection Forces, which pays local Arab tribes to protect sections through their territory. The line has been safe since local Arab tribes set up awakening councils in late 2007. Crisis Group interview, Hassan Turan, Kirkuk, 18 June 2008.

125. Crisis Group interviews, Manaa Alobaydi, director general of the North Oil Company, Kirkuk, 27 December 2007 and 24 January 2008.

126. In 1999, production was 900,000 b/d after a long period of low activity due to bomb damage during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and UN-imposed sanctions in the 1990s. “Iraq managing to increase production”, Alexander´s Gas & Oil Connections, News and Trends: Middle East, vol. 5, no. 3 (21 February 2000). Before the 2003 invasion, some 700,000-800,000 b/d were sent through the pipeline to Ceyhan. Current plans are to increase production to one million b/d by 2010, most for export. Dow Jones Newswires, 11 June 2006.

127. Kirkuk has four producing oil fields, of which the Kirkuk field is the largest. The others are Bai Hassan, Jambour and Khabbaz. These three additional fields have combined estimated reserves of as much as four billion barrels and potential production capacity of 220,000 b/d. Platts Oilgram News, op. cit. The Kirkuk field has four domes: Baba on Kirkuk city´s outskirts, Avana in Dibs, Khurmala north of Dibs and Zab north of the Greater Zab, a non-producing field. There are also three discovered but undeveloped fields: Hamrin, Ismail and Judaida, which have been estimated to have combined reserves of 2.5 billion barrels, ibid. See map in Appendix D below.

128. KRG media release, 6 November 2007, www.krg.org/

articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&

anr= 21217. KNOC was established under the KRG´s 2007 oil and gas law.

129. United Press International, 28 November 2007 and 17 June 2008.

130. Ashti Hawrami said: “We have shortages of fuel products. Every winter we are suffering. All we are doing is solving that problem by utilizing the crude oil, that´s all”. Quoted in United Press International, 28 November 2007.

131. Ashti Hawrami said, “Khurmala Dome is not in a disputed area. It´s in Kurdistan, period….People say KRG are not allowing them [federal workers] to work in Khurmala. What that really says is it´s under KRG control, and we´d like to get it back from them”. Quoted in United Press International, 17 June 2008.

132. Quoted in United Press International, 28 November 2007.

133. In December 2004, the Iraqi oil ministry awarded a contract to the Iraq-based KAR group to provide engineering and equipment for developing Khurmala dome. Iraq´s oil minister, Hussain al-Shahristani, said Khurmala was “one of the three domes of the Kirkuk field, which is a producing field”. Quoted in United Press International, 17 June 2008. The director general of the North Oil Company declared more specifically that it has been producing 35,000 b/d since 14 August 2004. Faxed letter to Crisis Group, 3 March 2008. The constitution does not define a “producing” or “current” versus a “future” field, but the KRG´s oil and gas law defines a “current” field as “a Petroleum Field that has been in Commercial Production prior to 15 August 2005”, and a “future” field as “a Petroleum Field that was not in Commercial Production prior to 15 August 2005, and any other Petroleum Field that may have been, or may be, discovered as a result of subsequent exploration”.

134. Quoted in United Press International, 17 June 2008. Hawrami had earlier said, “there is no hard line drawn somewhere that says this is KRG controlled territory and these are disputed territories, it is all gray areas. We provide the security; administratively we run the towns and villages in that area. It is and has always been under control of KRG, under our security”. He also noted, however: “Assuming we go a step further and say it is not, say it transpires later on we were wrong for some reason. Well the contract is an Iraqi contract anyways, and whoever controls that region can administer the contract. It is no problem”. Quoted in United Press International, 28 November 2007.

135. Article 140(1) of the Iraqi constitution instructs the executive authority to implement Article 58 of the interim constitution, the TAL, Article 58(B) of which states, in part: “The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution”. Kurdish leaders repeatedly have made clear that they want districts previously belonging to Kirkuk to be restored.

136. Fields not already mentioned that appear to straddle the green line include Demirdagh in Erbil governorate and Jabal Kind, which is located on the boundary between Dohuk and Ninewa governorates. The Ain Zalah and Raffan fields in Ninewa governorate appear to lie close enough to the green line to have the potential to spark conflict. See map in Appendix D below.

137. The Chamchamal gas field also straddles the green line but is not yet technically a field, as no commercially recoverable gas has been found. Three wells have been dug, two dry; a third showed traces of hydrocarbons but appears unable to produce more than 100 b/d – insufficient to be commercially viable (the industrial minimum output for viability is 2,000 b/d). Further exploration could yield better results. Crisis Group interview, Manaa Alobaydi, director general, North Oil Company, Kirkuk, 24 January 2008. A similar but unconfirmed case of a field in the Kurdistan region but extending into disputed territories involves the Khormor gas field, which straddles the green line between Suleimaniya and Salah al-Din governorates. The contract was awarded to the UAE´s Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, which announced the start of production in October 2008. Khormor was known as “Al-Anfal” during the old regime, a particularly cruel name, as the genocidal Anfal campaign was fiercest in the area of this oil field, around the town of Qader Karam in the Germian region.

138. A similar conflict could arise over two other possible blocks (K17 and K43) awarded to the KRG-owned KEPCO for joint development with yet-to-be-contracted international oil companies and located in areas directly adjacent to disputed territories.

139. See Middle East Economic Survey, 15 October 2007. The validity of such claims is difficult to determine, as the edges of geological structures do not align with politically determined geographic boundaries. It is easily conceivable that oil fields inside the Kurdistan region would protrude into adjacent areas. See the block map in Appendix C for the approximate location of the block awarded to Hunt Oil.

140. Crisis Group email communication, Ben Lando, United Press International, 18 March 2008. While this sounds fair, revenues from local production are not being shared due to a dispute over the price of KRG-pumped oil. The federal government values it at the international market price; the KRG, perhaps not unreasonably, insists its value is the price at which it is sold on the local market. The conflict may have its origin in suspicion KRG oil is smuggled abroad to fetch a higher price. (See above.)

141. The 7 August 2006 draft was overtaken on 22 October. A memorandum noted the new draft would “not give the Minister the power to administer petroleum operations in the Disputed Territories except by agreement with the Government of Iraq”.

142. It reportedly concerns three oil fields (Qamar, Gullabat and Naudoman) and one gas field (Khashm al-Ahmar). Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 6 October 2008. See map in Appendix D for locations.

143. The Khanaqin field reportedly started production along with the Kirkuk field in 1927. The local oil company was said to employ 400 people and the associated refinery another 500-600 when both were closed in 1983 because of the Iran-Iraq war (Khanaqin is a border town). Until then, the field had been producing a modest 10,000 b/d for domestic consumption. Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Amin Hassan Husein, Khanaqin district manager (qaym maqam), Khanaqin 24 June 2008. The field´s name is Naft Khana. Other fields in the Khanaqin district are Nau Doman and Chia Surkh. See map in Appendix D below.

144. In addition to the Kirkuk field´s Avana dome, there are two oil fields in Makhmour: Qarachaug and Makhmour. Wells dug in the 1980s and 1990s are no longer producing. Crisis Group interview, Rokiya Muhammad Salih, Makhmour municipality director, Makhmour, 21 June 2008.

145. For information on fields in the north, including the Kurdistan region and disputed territories, see www.thefreelibrary.com/IRAQ+-+The+Main+Fields+In+The+North-a0132031663.

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